Wooing the "Nones"

As we noted in a previous post there is an increasing number of people, especially young adults, who the authors of American Grace term "Nones."  They are "Nones" because they choose not to identify with any particular religious tradition.  We've noted that many have been turned off by what they perceive are the "political overtones" of religion -- especially conservative politics.   So, is it possible that these disaffected younger adults might be enticed to come into the church?  Well, the authors say it's possible -- because they aren't by nature "ardent secularists."  They write that "a large portion of those who demur from indicating a formal religious affiliation believe religion is important, pray regularly, and even attend a congregation on occasion" (American Grace, p. 176).  They are, what sociologists Michael Hout and Claude Fischer call "unchurched believers."  They are, thus to quote the Putnam and Campbell, "an inviting target for "religious entrepreneurs."  

The term religious entrepreneurs might sound a bit off putting, but their point is well-taken.  It will take people who are willing to take risks and try new things to reach this group of disaffected people.  And what would this look like?  Well, if its partisan politics or a merging of religion and politics, especially relating to sex and family issues that can be seen in the evangelical/GOP alliance, that pushes them away, then it would be helpful to  deemphasize these kinds of issues in favor of others.  That might be a harbinger of good things for mainline churches that aren't as linked to such emphases.

Of course there is the possibility that something more geared toward them, such as the emerging church or emergent church movements might be more successful.  The reality, as the authors see it, innovation is at the heart of the effort.  I would add that from watching the young adults I'm in conversation with, there is a strong desire to be doing something, not just watching something be done.  They're not interested in committees, but they do want to make a difference. 

Can this be done?  Yes, I believe it can.  That is the possibility raised in a more detached way in American Grace and in a more direct way by Carol Howard Merritt in her book Reframing Hope (Alban, 2010).

Social/Moral Views of the "Nones"

In my series of reflections on the evolution of American religious identity from the 1950s to the present, which draw upon the Putnam/Campbell book American Grace I have noted that we've seen the nation's religiosity swing back and forth, from highly religious, to not so religious and then a return back to conservative religious values.  That last more conservative era of young adults began to end early in the 1990s.  Since then we've seen the pendulum swing the other way, and it is seen expressed most clearly in the movement away from "organized religion."  

The question that lies before us is why this is happening, or more specifically -- what markers are there that suggest a trend.  Robert Putnam and David Campbell point to attitudes among the rising generation toward homosexuality and marijuana.  And, not surprising those who take a more liberal view of these two issues tend to predominate among "Nones."  That is, as the authors note:  "liberal views on sexual morality contributed to their disaffection from religion" (p. 130).  This likely isn't news to many.  In fact, while I don't care for the Kinnaman/Lyon's book UnChristian, they also demonstrate that those most disaffected by organized forms of religion find the church's views on homosexuality distasteful.    

Consider what Putnam and Campbell write:

We make no strong claims about causation here, and we do not believe that it was simply differences over public policy that weakened the ties of this generation to organized religion.  Rather, we suggest, the dramatic contrast between a young generation increasingly liberal on certain moral and lifestyle issues (though still potentially open to religious feelings and ideals) and an older generation of religious leaders who seemed consumed by the political fight against gay marriage was one important source of the second aftershock. (p. 130).

This change of attitude has led to increased unease about mixing religion and politics -- and thus engaging in culture wars.  By continuing to fight these battles the church seems likely to continue pushing younger folks away.

Do give a little context from the news to bolster this change of attitude, I'd point to the debate over abolishing "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the military.  According to the Pentagon Report, about 70% of rank and file military have no problem or are neutral regarding the presence of gays serving openly in the military.  Where the problem seems to lie, is among older officers and the large contingent of evangelical chaplains (and certain members of Congress). 

Whether older generations or culture warriors like it or not the times, they are a changin'."  The question is -- how will the church respond?  And if it seeks to keep gays and lesbians at bay, push the upcoming generations further away from the church?

America's Religious Identity -- Boom, Shocks, and After-shocks (Part 4 -- Second Aftershock)

If you can remember back that far, the 1950s and early 1960s were the hey day of institutional religion.  I was, as I've noted, born at the end of the 1950s, grew up in the 60s and 70s and came of age in the early 70s.  I was born into a mainline church, but left it for a more "charismatic" and conservative religious orientation in the mid to late 70s.  Over time I grew disenchanted with my charismatic context, in large part due to the anti-intellectualism that I found there.  I will add, that I also found a lot of hypocrisy in that group as well.  We were very competent in covering our ways in spiritual language.  But, I didn't go "liberal" overnight.  I went to a premier evangelical seminary, though in evangelical circles Fuller is considered liberal, and while I continue to value my education at Fuller, I continued to chaff under the evangelical sub-culture that seemed unable to wrestle in meaningful ways with the intellectual challenges of the age.  That's my story, but there is another story of a more dramatic aftershock to the conservative aftershock of the 1970s and 1980s.

Robert Putnam and David Campbell, writing in their book American Grace, suggest that when we look at demographics, we need to keep in mind that the overall numbers change slowly as one generation gives way to another.  Consider that yesterday we observed Pearl Harbor Day.  World War II began for Americans on December 7, 1941.  That was 69 years ago.  Even the youngest survivors of that day are in their late 80s.   The Greatest Generation, the generation that birthed the Baby Boom and that fueled the religious surge in the 1950s and 1960s is dying off and soon their presence will no longer be felt.  This generation, along with the one that came of age right after WW II, the folks that fought in Korea and have not made as much of a dent in the public mind as either the Greatest Generation or the Baby Boomers, they're aging as well.  Both of these generations are relatively conservative.  As they pass away, the younger generations will begin to make themselves felt. 

Well, if the later Baby Boomers (sometimes called the Jones Generation) and the GenXers were more conservative, leading to the first aftershock, there is a new generation coming of age, and they are both more liberal and increasingly disaffected from institutional forms of religion.  I know one of these people quite well --he's my son!  

One of the key changes in this new generation is the growing presence of what have come to be known as the "None's."  They're a bit like the growing numbers of Americans who choose as their political party affiliation -- Decline to State.  Putnam and Campbell note that in the pre-boomer years maybe 5-7% of the population would have claimed no religious affiliation ("nones").  That doubled among boomers (10-15%), and that has doubled again to 20-30% among those who have come of age in the past two decades.   The authors note that there is no evidence to show that as these younger generations age they're becoming more attached to institutional religion.  Here is the kicker:

Since 2000 generational succession has meant that cohorts of whom barely 5 percent say they have no religious affiliation are being replaced by cohorts of whom roughly 25 percent say they have no religion, massively increasing the nationwide incidence of nones.  (American Grace, p. 123).

It's not that they don't believe in God or seek some kind of spiritual sustenance, as the authors note there are few atheists or agnostics in this bunch.  The New Atheists are making a big splash, but they're really not making many converts!  Many of this new cohorts of "Nones" emerge from homes that were not religious to begin with -- that is children of Boomers who never got introduced to the church or synagogue, but they are also increasingly present among children of the devout, even among the evangelicals.  

And, note this:

The new nones are heavily drawn from the center and left of the political spectrum.  Hout and Fischer have shown that the rise of the new nones closely corresponds (with a lag of about half a decade) to the visibility of the Religious Right in the public media, suggesting that the rise of the nones might be some sort of backlash against religious conservativism.  Our Faith Matters surveys confirm that few of the new nones come from the right half of the political spectrum. (American Grace, p. 127).

Although there are more progressive alternatives to conservative forms of religion, it would appear that the younger cohort isn't paying much attention to these alternatives.  Institutional forms of religion seem to them to be inherently politicized, and they'll get their politics elsewhere.

So, what does this bode for the church?   Although evangelicalism continues to have some presence, the trends don't look good for them either.  Evangelicals could be in much the same place that Mainliners were four decades ago.  And the movements that are tapping into all of this change are what have been called Emergent or Emerging churches.  

I think that the past two election cycles are good examples of this.  In 2008, President Obama and the Democrats had an amazing year, sweeping the Republicans out of the White House and creating huge majorities in Congress.  They did this with a lot of help from young voters.  In 2010, the situation reversed itself.  But all of the polling suggests that the electorate of 2010 was much older than the general population.  Will this reverse itself in 2012?  It's too early to say, but I think it's interesting to note that the Fox viewership mirrors the 2010 electorate, it's getting older.  Younger adults, who didn't show up at the polls in 2010, are turning to Stewart and Colbert!   Oh, and I thought interesting that the median age of viewers for Sarah Palin's Alaska was 57 years old, 15 years older than the typical TLC audience.  

The second aftershock is only now making itself felt -- the question that political parties and religious institutions need to consider, is how this shift will affect their longevity!