America's Religious Identity -- Boom, Shocks, and After-shocks (Part 3A -- First Aftershock)

I want to spend a bit more time on the first aftershock to the 1960s reaction to the 1950s religiosity.  Robert Putnam and David Campbell, in their book, American Grace, have gone into some detail exploring the rise of evangelicalism in the 1970s and 1980s, a period in which the nation itself saw a conservative reaction to the more liberal 1960s.  They note the usual explanations, including higher birth rates and retention, as well as the possibility of converts. 

They note that conversion rates to evangelicalism rose signficantly during this period, with 1/3 of evangelicals today not being raised in evangelical homes.  They have also not suffered as much from intergenerational loss as Mainline and Catholic Churches (Catholic stability is the result of immigration, especially Hispanic immigration).  They note that as late as the 1960s, evangelical churches tended to lose some among their younger generations to Mainline churches as they rose into the middle class -- trading Baptist for Episcopal, even as they traded Chevy for Buick.  But in this period educated young adults stayed home. 

As they explore the demographics, they note that the studies suggest that the nation may have, during this period began to move in a rightward direction.  And if you look around, you'll find much evidence to support this -- especially for those who are forty years and older.  Although there are younger people in the Tea Party ranks, if you look closely the majority are 50 plus.  I think if you check, Fox News does best among the same demographic. Oh, and the demographics for Sarah Palin's Alaska series -- the median age for week 2 was 57 years old, 15 years older than the typical TLC audience. 

But, back to the period of the 1970s and 1980s when a conservative aftershock was first being felt (when I was just coming of age).  It doesn't seem as if this change was just theologically driven, as affirmations of biblical literalism have declined through this entire period.  Part of the answer may be simpler than you'd think -- "greater organizational energy and inventiveness" (p. 113).  Why have conservative evangelicals thrived?  It's not necessarily their theology or even their politics, but their entrepreneurial spirit -- their inventiveness -- contemporary music, worship, etc.  Going back to the 1970s, while mainline churches continued to affirm traditional liturgy and music (with the brief exception of folk mass forays), evangelicals embraced contemporary Christian music.  Jesus music proliferated.  They also made better use of small groups and of course they built churches in the suburbs and along freeways.  Oh, and they were strongly present on college campuses -- Campus Crusade for Christ, Navigators, and InterVarsity all being good examples -- while mainline campus ministries went into steep decline.

Still, the authors don't think this is the final explanation for the growing influence of conservative evangelicalism.  They suggest that the answer might be found in a Pauline injunction to "stand firm."  

This was an age of turmoil that many Americans found deeply repugnant to their fundamental moral and religious views.  Other trumpets might be uncertain, but evangelical trumpets were not.  Evangelicals were prepared to heed Paul's advice and stand up for their values.  (American Grace, p. 113).  

Even as Mainline churches expressed uncertainty in the face of change -- they seemed to cling to traditional liturgy and structures, while allowing more diversity in theology and moral practice, evangelicals seemed to stay true to traditional theology and values (even if they did so with new liturgical forms).  Consider:

Evangelicals' distinctive moral outlook, inherited from their fundamentalist forebears, is dark and somewhat puritanical (or Victorian).  They share a view of the world as sinful and of God as a harsh judge.  For them, heaven, hell and judgment day are realities, not metaphors, and moral issues are framed in absolute, black-and-white terms.  (American Grace, p. 113-114). 

And after the 1960s, this firmness of conviction seemed attractive to many, including to many younger adults who came of age at about the same time I did.   

I wanted to dig a bit deeper into this reaction, because it sets up a major aftershock to the first aftershock, and it helps explain why younger adults are fleeing churches today, whether conservative or liberal.  So, on to part 4!

America's Religious Identity -- Boom, Shocks, and After-shocks (Part 3 -- First Aftershock)

I graduated from high school in 1976, and we were by most measures a rather religious bunch.  My principal told my mother that my class was the most religious he'd ever seen come through the school (and he'd been there a long time).  Back in the mid to late 70s we saw Jimmy Carter ride a wave of evangelical support into the White House.  Being a Republican at the time I had to defend Gerry Ford's Christian faith.  The Moral Majority was active, Pat Robertson was popular, and Bill Bright sponsored his "I Found It" campaign, wherein blue bumper stickers got placed everywhere imaginable.  Oh, and I left my Episcopal church home for the excitement of the local Foursquare Church, along with a lot of other mainliners, who were attracted to the Jesus People message, and the Christian rock and roll (Love Song, Larry Norman, Barry McGuire, Keith Green, et al). 

According to Robert Putnam and Dennis Campbell, I was part of a conservative aftershock.  The excesses of the 1960s, which had been accompanied by major social/cultural changes, including the Civil Rights Movement and the Sexual Revolution, led to Richard Nixon's election in 1968 as voice of the so-called "Silent Majority," the "majority" that had not come of age in the 1960s.  As I came of age, I was caught up in this reaction that stemmed for a time, at least, the attendance decreases in the churches -- only the more liberal mainline churches continued to empty out -- in part due to a lower birth rate -- but also because many young adults, like me, chose to move over to the more conservative evangelical churches.  My cohort, which came of age in the late 70s and early 80s even saw an increase in attendance.  

Putnam and Campbell write that conservative religiosity in the 1970s and 1980s was most visible in the same niche as was the radicalism of the 1960s -- the college age group.  They note that while student radicalism peaked around 1968, by 1971 a new quietism had hit the campuses.  Interestingly, a more liberal view of sex continued through this era (we didn't go back to the 50s in this area).  What is interesting is the change in religious identification.  Whereas the number of college freshman who rejected a religious identity doubled between 1966 and 1971, it went up just as quickly in the following decade (my decade).  

But, again the key component here is not just that they returned to church, but the churches to which they turned.  

Just as in politics, many Americans of all ages were deeply troubled by the moral and religious developments of the Sixties.  For the next two decades, these people -- conservative in both religion and politics -- swelled the ranks both of evangelical Protestant denominations and of the rapidly growing evangelical megachurches that disavowed denominations and termed themselves simply "Christian." (American Grace, pp. 102-103). 

Thus, we can see the evangelical boom as a conservative reaction to the 1960s, but like all things, booms tend to come to an end, even if their after-effects continue long afterward.  One of the explanations for evangelical growth has been higher birth rates and more effectiveness in retaining one's young people.  

But as important as this growth in evangelicalism, Putnam and Campbell note that this evangelical rise began to dissipate in the early 1990s, and that over the past two decades the number of evangelicals has actually declined.  In fact, without the increases in non-denominational churches, the evangelical decline would have been even greater.  Therefore, and here is the kicker, "In twenty-first century America expansive evangelicalism is a feature of the past, not the present" (American Grace, p. 105). 

What this leads us to is the current cohort, and another aftershock -- a response to the aftershock of the Carter/Reagan era!  But that's for Part 4 of this series.  What is clear, and what Putnam and Campbell want us to understand is that the aggregate picture changes, gradually and slowly, but it changes none the less.  The 1960s provided clear change, especially in reaction to the perceived political radicalism of the age and the moral excesses (but even then a more permissive attitude persisted, even if tempered by a more conservative religious perspective).  But, as the Greatest Generation dies off, their conservatism will dissipate, and the early Boomers (those who came of age in the 1960s will see their influence grow), and on we go until we reach the current cohort, my son's cohort. 

Where will the political and religious trends take us?